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The paper analyses the effects of the present-bias in terms of reduction of the welfare of future generations in 
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present bias on the intergenerational equity can occur.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the wise management of resources designated for present and future generations, a 
crucial role is played by the discounting used from the present generation. The discount rate 
applied to the intertemporal management of renewable resources involves several orders of 
problems, one of which is the possibility that the discount rate does not respond to the 
principle of time consistency. A time inconsistency situation implies that an optimal choice 
defined in the present could be revisited in the future (Strotz, 1955). The origin of this 
phenomenon is the present bias that determines the emergence of preference reversals that 
generate a conflict between the long-run preferences and immediate choices. When the task 
involves intertemporal decisions, the absence of a constant discount factor determines the 
condition of possible revaluation of the choices made, changing it from what was estimated 
before. This behavior, in the context of management of resources, induces people to change 
their harvesting path. In fact, one of the elements that is strictly related to the present bias is 
the preference-reversal behavior. The presence of preference reversals is consistent with 
agents who show a diminishing impatience such that the future is discounted with a 
declining discount rate (Hepburn et al., 2010). 
In the last few years, some studies have started to explore the applications of the non-
constant discount rate in resources management (Settle and Shogren, 2004) and in contexts 
related to the environment (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Karp, 2005) that start to 
show the dichotomy that intervenes between the present-biased agents and the rational ones 
(Hepburn et al., 2010; Winkler, 2006). However, as Gsottbauer and van den Bergh (2011) 
remarked, the studies that investigate non-constant discounting in resources management 
have excluded from their analysis the other-regarding preferences. The assertion is well-
founded. In the analysis of the impact of present-bias on agents’ behaviors, excluding the 
other-regarding and social preferences limits the analysis of the real peculiarities of people. 
In fact, other-regarding preferences are found in everyday life, with the evidence that the 
individuals have carefulness concepts such as fairness (Gintis, 2000), and they adopt pro-
social behaviors in a wide range of situations (Alpizar et al., 2008; Frey and Meier, 2004; 
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Meier and Stutzer, 2008) and in different cultures (Henrich et al., 2005). Furthermore, in 
the literature, there are several robust studies that show the validity for an inclusion of the 
other-regarding motives in the study of the economic behaviors (Fehr and Gächter, 2002, 
2000; Gächter, 2007; Gintis et al., 2005). For these reasons, the purpose of this work is to 
investigate the effects of present-bias in renewable resource management, analyzing the 
impact of myopic behaviors on the transfer of resources from one generation to the next 
one, taking care of the other-regarding motives of the individual. 
It is known that the use of resources assumes, for intrinsic nature, an intergenerational 
dimension. In this context, it is evident that the externalities derived from the behavior of a 
single agent within a community often generate effects not only on other members of the 
community that take their actions at the same time. But frequently, negative externalities 
can affect future generations of the community whose welfare depends on the level of 
impoverishment to which the resources were previously subjected.  
When the resource management suffers the risk related to the present bias, it is necessary to 
understand in what manner present-biased behaviors affect the intertemporal dynamic in 
relation to the intergenerational preferences of a naïve agent who has social preferences for 
his successors. Present bias and the related reversal preferences can change the outcome of 
the other-regarding choices posed at the beginning by the agent who has to leave some part 
of resources for future generations. For these reasons, this study investigates the effect of 
present bias on the welfare of future generations, taking care of other-regarding and social 
preferences of the agent. 
This work also focuses on the different way in which an agent can express his social and 
other regarding preferences. In fact, they can be expressed with the spontaneous choices 
taken in accord with other-regarding preferences without social or institutional 
interventions, but also with the compliance to the specific social norms that the community 
defines. In fact, the capability of human society to define social norms is one of the 
elements that characterize the sociability itself, communities and individuals express their 
other-regarding preferences also through the social norm. 
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2. Intertemporal myopia in resource management 
 
Resources management is not an easy task for individuals, in particular when they have 
important decisional myopia (Pevnitskaya and Ryvkin, 2013). The intergenerational 
management of resources can suffer the conflict between long-run preferences and 
immediate choices when due to the present bias preferences there emerges a conflict 
between the early intention of the agent and the choice made in the present. The conflict 
arises due to the time dependency of the discount rate, generating time-inconsistent 
decisions. Behaviors that contradict the time-consistence assumption are widely studied 
(Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). The systematic tendency of a 
greater discount in the near future rather than in the distant one is a consequence of 
people’s impulsivity and lack in self-control (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999), and it is clear that the exponential discount rate cannot represent this phenomenon 
(Laibson, 1997). The effects of present bias have been investigated in several areas: low 
saving rate (Ashraf et al., 2006; Harris and Laibson, 2001; Laibson, 1997; Laibson et al., 
1998), health contexts (van der Pol and Cairns, 2002), drugs, smoking or buying addictions 
(Frederick et al., 2002; Gruber and Koszegi, 2001; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Wertenbroch, 
1998), and behaviors of procrastination (Benabou and Tirole, 2003; O’Donoghue and 
Rabin, 1999). As well as the areas just mentioned, resources management is a field where 
present bias has a strong potential impact. In fact, the risks associated with preference 
reversals and the “dictatorship of the present” increase in settings where long-term interests 
may conflict with immediate consumptions. This conflict can typically emerge in all the 
fields of public and common goods — in public goods, this is emphasized in  Winkler 
(2006) — and this conflict strongly characterizes the intergenerational resource 
management. For instance, the extraction of natural resources is a typical area where this 
conflict can emerge. In this case, present biased decisions can potentially lead to excessive 
resource depletion. It is shown that if non-constant discount rates are applied in the 
management of a stock of natural resources, without a commitment to the policy 
implemented, the possibility that the governance planner revaluates the plan will lead to a 
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collapse of the resources (Hepburn et al., 2010). Settle and Shogren (2004) showed that 
non-constant discounting affects the optimal resource management because it makes 
possible offering a justification of a future change in the decisions of the policymaker. 
Therefore, in intergenerational management, present-biased preferences could compromise 
the wise management of the resource stock. The use of a higher discount rate in the short-
term can determine that the community’s welfare — which also includes the well-being of 
future generations — would be jeopardized by the excessive weight of the present. 
However, when the query involves renewable resources from the intergenerational 
perspective, the discussion is not limited merely to the impoverishment of the stock of 
resources for effect of the allocation of the harvesting amounts over the time by the present 
generation for their own consumption preferences. In fact, the issue also involves the social 
dimension in relation to the intergenerational equity and the welfare of future generations. 
In fact, as it will be discussed in the next section, individuals have social preferences such 
that they assign a positive value to the welfare of the future generations. Therefore, in 
intertemporal resources management, present generations also include the welfare of the 
future generations in their decisional process. In this manner, the present generation has the 
aim of behaving in accordance with its own social preferences, leaving a given amount of 
resources to designate to the consumption of the following generations. As long as the 
intertemporal choices of the individual are time-consistent, it is clear that the outcome of 
the decision taken also responds to the social preferences of the individual himself. But, in 
the absence of time-consistency, when the agent behaves myopically under the effect of 
present bias, the coherence between improved action and early intention of the individual 
can fade away. For this reason, this study queries the behavior traits that emerge when the 
agent is present-biased even in the presence of social preferences in favor of future 
generations, which are expressed through adherence to genuine other-regarding forms of 
behavior or social norms.  
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3. A retrospective on other-regarding motives 
 
In a common resource dilemma, the economic theory prescribes the overexploitation of 
resources, synthesized by the famous expression “tragedy of the common” used by Hardin 
(1968). This phenomenon depends on the benefit that one derives from an extra unit of 
consumption of the common resources when the cost of the reduction of the stock of 
commons is divided between all the members of the community that use it, not only 
between those who consume the extra units. Therefore, agents who take decisions in 
conformity with their own exclusive self-interest without caring about the consequences on 
the wealth of others, contribute to the overexploitation of the stock of resources. These 
kinds of behaviors are prescript and predicted because the assumptions on the economic 
behavior of the agents are built on the axiom of self-interest. This axiom is a behavioral 
assumption that is defined in function of a coherent adhesion to the three logical processes 
that lead the way to the thinking and operating of a homo oeconomicus: Self-centered 
welfare, self-welfare goal, and self-goal choice (Sen, 1985) — building a theoretical system 
of economic interactions composed of exclusive selfish agents. However, events that 
contradict this assumption are observable daily in the reality of human interactions. The 
exclusive self-interested axiomatization does not appear to represent the peculiarities of 
human behavior. Interdependence between one’s own wealth and that of others exists and is 
one of the foundations of human society. Hence, economic issues that involve the social 
dimension of human behavior require us to relax the assumption that agents are only self-
interested. 
Several studies have investigated the real foundation of economics when the agents operate 
choices and decisions within a social context, showing with undoubted clarity that 
individual decisions are mediated by other-regarding motives and by social preferences, 
such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity (Andreoni, 1990; Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Rabin, 1993). 
To understand the role of other-regarding preferences in social dilemmas, there are 
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abundant contributions in the literature that show that fairness principles contribute to the 
formulation of the agent's choices (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter, 2007; Ostrom et al., 
1992). Several analyses and investigations have confirmed the ability of humans to 
voluntarily sustain cooperation in the case of resource dilemmas (Andreoni, 1988; Casari 
and Plott, 2003; Charness and Villeval, 2009; Chaudhuri, 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; 
Ledyard, 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992). Furthermore, the consequences of the introduction of 
other-regarding preferences in the theoretical framework of the management of commons 
and in environmental and resource issues have acquired great attention more recently 
(Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, 2008; Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2012; Gowdy, 
2008; Gsottbauer and van den Bergh, 2011; S. Frey and Stutzer, 2006). 
The other-regarding motives have an important role in the management of renewable 
resources and regarding the value of equity distribution. As Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) 
pointed out, “other-regarding preferences” means that the agents show these preferences 
when they give value to the payoffs of the reference agents. In the context of renewable 
resources, the fairness principle becomes a diriment element in the decisional process that 
occurs to determine how much to harvest and consume in order to behave in conformity to 
one’s own other-regarding preferences with reference to the wealth of the others. The 
others are not only those that simultaneously harvest the same resources but also the 
successors who will start to harvest in future, when the resources are destined to an 
intergenerational use. Hence, the inclusion of other-regarding preferences is essential for 
the equity distribution principles that affect the harvesting strategies taking care of the 
intergenerational externalities. For this reason, in the following sections, the effects of the 
present-bias will be investigated in terms of reduction in the welfare of future generations, 
and with these elements, a model will be constructed that provides a reason for the main 
instances that are posed by the present-bias. Because on one side, there are no doubts about 
the existence of cooperation and equity distribution capabilities of people — and that these 
capabilities are part of the success of human evolution(Gintis, 2009); on the other side, the 
reason why societies sometimes fail to reach the level of fairness and intergenerational 
equity that they desire is unclear. For this reason, this work will explicate how present bias 
other-regarding preferences and social norms in the intergenerational transfer of renewable resources when 
agent has present-biased preferences 
7 
 
can affect the intergenerational equity in presence of other-regarding preferences of the 
present generation, and it will address the opportunity to adopt social norms that sustain the 
social preferences that care about the intergenerational distribution of the resources, 
keeping in mind that the capability of building a behavioral norm inside a community is 
one of the most important and peculiar features of human sociality. 
 
4. Harvesting model and behavioral assumptions  
 
The model involves the harvesting activity from a stock of renewable resources: at time t 
the stock of resources is 𝑅(𝑡) and the amount harvested is ℎ(𝑡), the growth rate is 
𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) and the stock grows following: 
𝑅(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))𝑅(𝑡) − ℎ(𝑡), (1) 
where 𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡)) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡 in [0, 𝑇], and 𝑔, strictly positive, is the natural growth rate when 
the stock size does not affect the growth rate.1 Resources are materials, it is not possible to 
have a negative stock of resources, and the initial level of the stock is strictly positive: 
𝑅(𝑡) ≥ 0 ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇] (2) 
with 
𝑅(0) = 𝑅0 ,  𝑅0 > 0. (3) 
The amount harvested is not restorable such that: 
ℎ(𝑡) ≥ 0  ∀  𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (4) 
According to the resource constraint, the agent cannot harvest at time t more than the stock 
of resources available at the same time: 
ℎ(𝑡) ≤ 𝑅(𝑡) ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (5) 
                                                 
1The resources of the stock are not perishable. From this peculiarity derives the non-negative growth rate. 
And when 
𝜕𝑓(𝑔,𝑅(𝑡))
𝜕𝑅(𝑡)
= 0 the growth rate is a constant exponential one. 
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In the model, there are two generations, a first one that harvests for T periods, and a second 
one that starts to harvest after the first generation.  
The welfare’s agent of the first generation depends only on the amount harvested, and the 
utility function is expressed in the usual form: 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))𝑇𝑡=0 , (6) 
where 𝑢(ℎ(𝑡)) is monotonic and strictly concave on ℎ(𝑡): 
𝑢′(ℎ(𝑡)) > 0 , 𝑢′′(ℎ(𝑡)) < 0. (7) 
Continuity on the harvesting amount is assumed. Furthermore, 𝛿(𝑡) represents the discount 
factor. The cases of neutrality in the harvesting time and of pleasure in procrastination are 
excluded, such that: 
𝛿(𝑡) > 𝛿(𝑡 + 1) ∀ 𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝑇]. (8) 
The first generation is affected by present-bias, which implies: 
{
 
 
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
>
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
      with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 = 0,
𝛿𝑡
𝛿𝑡+1
=
𝛿𝑠
𝛿𝑠+1
      with   𝑡 < 𝑠   and   𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝑇]  for 𝑡 > 0.
 (9) 
Of course, in this condition, time consistency is impossible. 
 
The second generation starts harvesting from the residual stock of resources left 
unharvested by the first generation. Thus, there is an intergenerational transfer where the 
amount not harvested in the last period by the first generation is the initial stock for the 
subsequent generation: 
{[1+𝑓(𝑔, 𝑅(𝑡))]𝑅(𝑇) − ℎ(𝑇)} = 𝐷, (10) 
where D represents the initial stock for the second generation.  
 
Of course, if the first generation is absolutely selfish, nothing will be left to the next 
generation. However, total selfishness is not the real behavior of agents, as it is explicated 
in the retrospective on the other-regarding behaviors. Hence, in this model, the agent of the 
first generation takes care of the amount available for the successor because he has some 
social preferences about the intergenerational distribution. So, the first generation leaves a 
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given amount, D, unharvested at the end of the period T. 
The amount D depends on the lifetime-expected enjoyed revenue that the first agent (or 
generation) obtains, 𝜋, given the instantaneous utility of the agent such that: 
𝜋 =∑𝑢(ℎ(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
. (11) 
The transferred amount also depends on the intergenerational equity of the first generation, 
represented by a generic constant parameter, 𝛼, exogenous and unchangeable; hence, 
𝐷 = 𝑓(𝛼, 𝜋). (12) 
The amount transferred to the second generation increases with the increase in the total 
amount that the agent enjoyed during his lifetime: 
𝜕𝐷(𝛼, 𝜋)
𝜕𝜋
> 0. (13) 
At any period, the first generation defines the harvesting plan including the expected 
amount to transfer to the second generation.  
 
5. Consequences of present-biased behaviors on the welfare of future generations 
in presence of other-regarding preferences 
 
The issue that it is questioned here is how the adoption of a harvesting strategy influenced 
from presence biased preferences affects the intergenerational transfer, given the social 
preferences of the agent. 
 
The intertemporal harvesting plan of the agent is given by the maximization of the utility 
function (6) under the constraints expressed in (2), (3), (4) and (5), and the growth of the 
stock that follows the dynamics described in (1). To show the effect of present biased 
preferences on the intergenerational transfer, first, the effect on the lifetime-expected 
revenue enjoyed by the first generation must emerge.  
 
Hence, at time 0 the agent formulates the optimal harvesting plan for his lifetime: 
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𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑇)}. (14) 
But, the first generation adopts present-biased decisions so there are no guarantees about 
the time-consistency of the choices time after time. In this manner, the strategy effectively 
implemented by a biased agent does not coincide with the initial long-run optimal one, so 
the strategy effectively implemented will be a biased one, expressed as: 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), . . . , ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑇)}, (15) 
where Hbias is defined as the amounts that are derived time after time by the instantaneous 
maximization of the utility expressed in (6), under the constraints defined before, when the 
discount factor has the features expressed in (9).  
 
Because (9) implies that, with 0 < tb < 𝑠 at time 0: 
𝛿(𝑡𝑏)
𝛿(𝑡𝑏 + 1)
=
𝛿(𝑠)
𝛿(𝑠 + 1)
, (16) 
but later at time 𝑡𝑏: 
𝛿(𝑡𝑏)
𝛿(𝑡𝑏 + 1)
>
𝛿(𝑠)
𝛿(𝑠 + 1)
, (17) 
thus the agent harvests an amount greater in the biased harvesting plan, such that: 
ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏). (18) 
The direct consequences will be that the lifetime-expected enjoyed revenue that the first 
agent obtains, given the instantaneous utilities in the biased harvesting plan adopted, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, 
is lower than in the hypothetical optimal plan evaluated at time 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡: 
∑𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) >∑𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=0
𝑇
𝑡=0
. (19) 
 
Proof of (19): 
In order to show the assertions, a lifetime of 3 periods is considered where the lifetime-
expected enjoyed revenue is: 
𝜋 = 𝑢(ℎ(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ(2)). 
At time 0, the harvesting plan is defined by: 
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𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 = {ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0), ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1), ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)}, 
where 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑖 , ∀ 𝐻𝑖 ∈ 𝐻, and where H is the set that includes all the harvesting plans 
feasible by the agent. 
At time 1, the agent reformulates his harvesting plan for the present and future periods, 
implementing a different strategy in these periods: 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = {ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1), ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)}. 
But, 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 is one of all other feasible harvesting plans different from 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡, meaning that at 
time 0, 𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑡 ≻ 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, which implies: 
𝛿(0)𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝛿(1)𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝛿(2)𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2))
> 𝛿(0)𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝛿(1)𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝛿(2)𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)), 
thus: 
𝛿(1)𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) − 𝛿(1)𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) > 𝛿(2)𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) − 𝛿(2)𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)), then, 
𝛿(1)[𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))] < 𝛿(2)[𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))], hence, 
𝛿(1)
𝛿(2)
<
[𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))]
[𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))]
 . 
Because 
𝛿(1)
𝛿(2)
> 1, then 
[𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2))−𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2))]
[𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1))−𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1))]
> 1. So, 
𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) − 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)), and finally, 
𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)) such that: 
𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(2)) > 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(1)) + 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(2)), 
where 𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(0)) = 𝑢 (ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(0)). 
 
Hence, the present bias induces the agent of the first generation to adopt a strategy that 
implies an expected enjoyed revenue, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, lower than that one expected at the beginning, 
𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡. 
 
Considering that at time 0 the agent had defined a given harvesting strategy, Hopt, such that 
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he had predicted to obtain a given expected enjoyed revenue 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡, the predicted amount 
transferred to the future generation after time T predicted at time 0 was defined in relation 
to this predicted revenue such that, 
𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝑓(𝛼, 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡). (20) 
At time 𝑡𝑏, the present bias induces the agent to reevaluate his harvesting plan. The 
consequence, as shown in (19), is that the enjoyed revenue corresponding to the biased 
strategy, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠, is lower than 𝜋𝑜𝑝𝑡, such that at time 𝑡𝑏, the transfer amount is reevaluated in 
the function of the new level of expected enjoyed revenue, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠: 
𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝑓(𝛼, 𝜋𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠) (21) 
Thus, taking into account (13), a decrease in 𝜋 determines a decrease in the transfer amount 
such that: 
𝐷𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 < 𝐷𝑜𝑝𝑡. (22) 
 
At this point, it is trivial to show that period after period, when the effect of present biased 
preferences emerges, that the predicted transferred amount becomes smaller and smaller, 
and that in the final period T, the amount effectively left to the future generation will be 
lower than the amount that the agent would have left to the future generation given the 
same intergenerational preferences, but without the present-bias that swept him from his 
long-run harvesting path. 
 
Therefore, a biased strategy determines a reduction in the maximum welfare available for 
the future generation. The second generation, hence, suffers the consequences of a bias that 
affects the previous generation, without, for obvious reasons, having the opportunity to 
avoid the reductions of the initial stock of resources that he receives despite the initial 
intentions of the first generation. 
 
6. Advantage of the implementation of social norms 
 
When a naive agent is induced by present bias to leave to the future generation less than he 
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originally desired, it may be decisive if the individual has the chance to not merely follow 
his spontaneous biased behavior, but to find the support of some social norm that can make 
him apply some sort of commitment to his original choices. 
In fact, if the spontaneous social preferences of the agent are not sufficient to avoid the 
risks related to present biased discounting, the compliance to given social norms that 
require leaving an amount to the future generation not amenable to revision could offer an 
opportunity to commit the behavior of the agent to their first intentions. The social norm, in 
this case, will be a nudge to facilitate the agent to behave conformal to his initial 
intergenerational equity intention (Sunstein, 2014). 
The implementation of a social norm that prescribes to follow the initial harvesting plan can 
improve the intergenerational equity. In fact, when individuals act in compliance with their 
own spontaneous intergenerational preferences, without being bound by any social norms, 
there is not a constraint that guarantees the conservation of resources for the benefit of 
future generations avoiding the revaluation of the transfer amount. Conversely, the situation 
of the transferred amount is different if the agent manifests his own intergenerational 
preferences via compliance with a social norm that prescribes to donate to the future 
generation a determined amount, set out before the harvesting period, and thus, defined 
according to the initial stock of resources.  
When the social norm prescribes that the amount transferred, defined at the beginning, must 
not be subject to re-evaluation, the social norm is designed to commit the behavior of the 
agent. So, the presence of constraints arising from social norms can lead the individual to 
mitigate the re-evaluation of the amount to leave to the future generation. 
In order to have effects on the agent’s behavior, a social norm has to affect the perceived 
utility of the agent; in particular, the agent’s utility must be reduced when he does not 
behave in compliance with the social norm. However, it is important to avoid a situation 
where the reduction in the utility generated by non-compliance behavior induces the agent 
to further increase his harvesting amount. 
Considering that at time tb, when the agent is induced by the present bias to reevaluate his 
harvesting plan, the amount ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏), with ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏), is the only amount 
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harvestable at time tb such that: 
𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 ≻ 𝐻𝑗 ∀ 𝐻𝑗 ∈ 𝐻, (23) 
where H is the set that includes all the harvesting plans feasible by the agent, with 
  𝐻𝑗 : ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏). (24) 
Considering the disutility derived by the violation of the social norm, the condition that 
guarantees that (23) is still true requires that the disutility increase with the increasing 
differences between the amount harvested at time tb and the amount initially planned 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏). In fact, the agent will not harvest an amount ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) higher than ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) if the 
utility that can be obtained from the 𝐻𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 harvesting plan, considering also the reduction in 
the utility that the agent receives when he does not behave in compliance with the social 
norm, will still be higher than the utility obtainable with the  𝐻𝑗  plan inclusive of the 
reduction derived from the violation of the social norm. So, calling the disutility derived by 
a violation of the social norm as η will be: 
∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢(ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡)) − 𝜂ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 > ∑ 𝛿(𝑡)𝑢 (ℎ𝑗(𝑡)) − 𝜂ℎ𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑏
, (25) 
where is 𝜂 ≥ 0. 
The relation (25) is always satisfied for every ℎ𝑗(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑡𝑏) when 
𝜕𝜂
𝜕𝛾
 ≥ 0, (26) 
where 𝜂 = {
0, ℎ(𝑡𝑏) ≤ ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)
𝑓(𝛽, 𝛾), ℎ(𝑡𝑏) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏)
  
with 𝛾 = ℎ(𝑡𝑏) − ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡𝑏) and 𝑓(𝛽, 𝛾) > 0, 
where 𝛽 is a parameter that represents the value that the agent assigns to follow the social 
rules. Such that the disutility that the social norm generates when the agents violates the 
norm, 𝑓(𝛽, 𝛾), increases with an increasing of 𝛽: 
𝜕𝑓(𝛽,𝛾)
𝜕𝛽
> 0. (27) 
Furthermore, the social norm, in order to have the possibility to reduce the effect of present 
bias on the harvesting amount and consequently on the transferred amount to the future 
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generation, needs to generate a strictly marginal increasing disutility that the agent receives 
on the increasing of the difference between the amount effectively harvested and the 
amount initially planned, ℎ(𝑡) − ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡), such that: 
𝑓(𝛽, 𝛾) →
𝜕𝜂
𝜕𝛾
> 0 ∀ ℎ(𝑡) > ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡). (28) 
To have a positive effect, the social norm has to punish the present behavior of the agent 
reducing his utility in relation to the increasing of his present harvesting with respect to the 
amount initially planned. Strictly increasing disutility on the amount harvested in excess of 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑡) in no case will induce the agent to move further away from the initial harvesting 
path. A social norm with this peculiarity can reduce the effect of the present bias on the 
amount transferred to the future generation. The magnitude of the effect of the social norms 
to obtain the goal of preservation of the resources strongly depends by the intrinsic value 
that the agent assigns to the social norm, expressed with 𝛽. It means that the social norm to 
be effective needs to be accepted and internalised in the personal belief of the agent. 
An effective social norm must then have to stigmatize the present behavior of the agent. If 
the social constraint is sufficiently strong and the social disutility that the agent receives 
from the violation is sufficiently high, with a compliance strategy to a social norm 
representing the agent’s other-regarding preferences, it is possible to ensure a higher 
transfer amount of resources to future generations are not reduced by the present-bias 
effects. The social constraint, while an expression of the same other-regarding preference, 
offsets the effects of short-sighted behaviors — where a naive agent takes his own 
decisions only under the influence of present-bias — that in absence of social norms are 
without substantial barriers.  
In the context of intertemporal management of resources, the social norms should have the 
crucial role of expressing the other-regarding preferences of the agent in the management 
of resources such that the agent can keep the harvesting path as close as possible to the 
optimal one with a high compliance to the social norm. 
In fact, if the presence of the other-regarding preferences that are necessary and essential is 
not sufficient to guarantee the intergenerational equity, the other-regarding preferences need 
to be sustained by specific institutional mechanisms and brought into the community by 
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social norms that prescribe the behaviors more appropriately for guaranteeing the equity 
and availability of the resources between the different generations. 
 
7. Discussion and final remarks 
 
It is clear that in the context of renewable resources the acts of one generation impose 
externalities on the subsequent generations. In fact, a community is composed not only of 
the actual members but also of the future ones. This work has shown that the effect of 
present-bias is a problem for a community, not only for the effects on the single myopic 
agent and on a group with a more-or-less high presence of present-biased agents, but 
because intergenerational negative externalities exist.  
It has been shown that the choices influenced by present-bias lead the first generation to 
leave to the second less than what the first generation itself wanted. It is essentially an 
intergenerational reversal preference, in which the original intentions of people managing 
the resource stocks gradually get influenced by the strong temptation of the present, slowly 
eroding the resource volumes to leave to future generations. In fact, here we observed the 
contrast between the individual’s preferences when they are not subject to pressures from 
the present and the choices actually made when their own preferences are influenced by 
present-bias. Thus, the strategic short-sightedness imposed by the “dictatorship of the 
present” causes the agent's choices to divert away from optimal choices causing a reduction 
in the well-being of future generations despite the existence of strong social preferences. 
Thus present-bias causes serious damages in terms of intergenerational equity and 
sustainability of resource levels for future generations, even when the welfare of future 
generations is supported by other-regarding preferences. The lone other-regarding 
preferences of a naïve agent do not guarantee that the harvesting path will match with what 
is considered desirable and initially optimal. Resources management and conservation for 
future generations appears to be a complex task, which cannot be solved fully by the 
spontaneous behavior of naïve agents alone.  
Even if a generation has spontaneous and intrinsic intergenerational preferences to ensure 
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sustainability of resources for future generations, there is the limit that in the process of 
decision-making over time, the choices made are insufficient to keep the harvesting plan 
that leaves the resources amount initially suggested. If this amount had been defined in 
terms of sustainability for the future generation, the very sustainability of resources, even if 
desired by the present generation, would be compromised. 
Faced with this problem, this study has shown that if the social preferences of the 
individual are not left only and exclusively to their own spontaneous behavior, and if these 
social preferences are expressed by social norms charged with representing the individual's 
social preferences, a mitigation of the effect of present bias on the intergenerational equity 
can occur. 
In fact, individuals in a social context also express their preferences through specific social 
norms that they believe in. Hence, by compliance with these norms, individuals express 
their own preferences toward other members of the community. Individuals with social 
preferences do not act in isolation from the community they belong to. The manner in 
which social norms mediate individuals’ behavior is one of the prerogatives of human 
society. A community is also based on the relatively widespread adoption of specific social 
norms and clearly identifiable habits, whose adoption by an individual qualifies him in very 
specific terms. The compliance with social norms, in fact, elicits the self-image of the 
agents. Agents receive a benefit from expressing themselves through behaviors that are in 
compliance with their self-image and social identity, so compliance to social norms is in 
this way an expressive utility (Sunstein and Reisch, 2014). Furthermore, the social 
disapproving can induce individuals to behave conformally to the social norm in order to 
avoid being disapproved, obtaining from the social endorsement social or moral utility 
(Levitt and List, 2007). 
This, therefore, suggests that the welfare of future generations can be preserved by 
respecting the preferences of the current generation and implementing a social norm that 
defines given behavioral heuristics. Heuristics must be designed in a manner such that the 
social preferences of the members of the community are expressed not only by the volume 
of resources they leave to the next generation but also according to how this amount 
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matches the amount initially assessed. Indeed, this would facilitate the effective 
maintenance of resource stocks to be allocated to future generations initially defined 
according to the individual's preferences, which, though affected by present-bias would 
have a balancing effect due to compliance with social norms.  
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